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CHAPTER ONE 
BACK TO THE FUTURE OF THE BODY 
DOMINIC JANES 
 
 
 
In an engraving from around 1794, William Blake presents an image of the 
body as youthful, male, beautiful, racially white and enflamed in celestial 
radiance (fig. 1.1). This is the figure he called “Albion” and the print, in its 
various versions is known as “Glad Day”, “Albion Rose” and “The Dance of 
Albion”. The first uncoloured state of the engraving, dating from 1780, is 
accompanied by the following verse: “Albion rose from where he laboured at 
the mill with slaves - giving himself to the nations he danc’d the dance of 
eternal death”. Historicist readings suggest that we have, in the early version, an 
image of the revolutionary hero about to sacrifice himself for freedom. With the 
terrors of the French revolution, “Albion” develops as an allegory of the British 
people and its struggle for moral transcendence (Butlin, 1981: 27). 
Blake’s work gains much of its power by combining neo-classicism with 
esoteric and gothic themes. His nudes have been seen as exhibiting alternating 
desires to celebrate, evade and transform the body, such that much scholarship 
has read his work as representing unease with the material realm (Howard, 
1982). However, we do not need to see Blake as gradually abandoning the 
dreams of a glorious revolution on earth for a purely inner space of revelation. 
What Blake wanted was a perfect revolution; a perfect transformation in which 
the body was not let down by the mind and will, nor the mind and will by the 
body. As Engelstein argues: 
 
Repudiating an understanding of nature as predetermined and unalterable, Blake 
points to the potential for the birth of a radically different human body, ‘the 
Human Form Divine”… Blake’s emphasis on the power of imagination to effect 
change is by no means, however, a rejection of the material world. Instead, Blake 
undermines mind/body as well as subject/object dualisms in an attempt to create 
an interactive and flexible body which is no less material than its “natural” 
counterpart, but is no longer subject to its materiality (2000: 62). 
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Fig. 1.1, William Blake, Albion Rose, copyright, the Trustees of the British 
Museum 
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Kenneth Dutton has located the dream of the “perfectible body” deep in the 
classical Greek roots of western culture (Dutton, 1995). The result of the 
intervening Christianity was not so much as to destroy that dream, but to 
displace its realisation into the future Otherworld of Heaven. Blake’s engraving 
can, therefore, be read merely as being an artefact of the complexities of the 
reception of earlier religious beliefs and political ideologies. Albion’s body, in 
this view, is now a body of the past, the value which is only as historical 
evidence. But to privilege such a reading would be, I think, to deny the 
significance of Blake’s message. He was attempting to use his imagination to 
create a form of body that was not simply limited, transient, contingent and the 
sign of something else that is more important. 
A certain impatience with the material as mere flotsam on the sea of power 
and knowledge can be detected in some recent writing on the body. Canning 
describes how despite there being a “veritable flood” of work on the body, 
“many, even most of these studies merely invoke the body or allow the ‘body’ 
to serve as a more fashionable surrogate for sexuality, reproduction, or gender 
without referring to anything specifically identifiable as body, bodily or 
embodied” (Canning, 1999). Turner, addressing the same issue in relation to the 
body and religion, suggests that one way forward may be to focus on lived 
experience (Turner, 1997: 15-16). This volume represents an attempt to address 
some of Canning’s concerns through Turner’s means and, thereby, to get “back 
to the future of the body”. 
This is not simply an exercise in digging corpses out of the historical 
archive. The question is, rather, what can past lived and thought experiences of 
the body tell us about what the body can be(come)? Moreover, the body is not to 
be thought of as merely an “object” or simply a “sign”, but as an active 
participant in the shaping of cultural formations. As has been commented on the 
significance of space in the cultural history of prostitution: 
 
far from playing a passive backdrop to social and sexual relations, [space] plays 
an active role in the constitution of those relations, with the particularities of sites 
of sex work, whether on-street or off-street, reflecting and reproducing broader 
moral and social orders in a complex and sometimes contradictory manner 
(Hubbard, 1999: 31). 
 
The material world of spaces and thing is, therefore, not simply a place for the 
operation of power. Power, rather, has its material forms. What can past 
experiences, therefore, tell us about the potential for bodily empowerment? 
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The Context 
This volume consists of a set of case studies, representing a range of theoretical 
and methodological approaches. The origins of this collection lie in the work of 
the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities which has been involved in presenting 
a series of international workshops and conferences on the theme of the cultural 
life of the body. The rationale for these events was that, in concepts as diverse 
as the cyborg, the questioning of mind/body dualism, the contemporary image 
of the suicide bomber and the patenting of human genes, we can identify ways 
in which the future of the human body has become ambiguous. The aim of these 
international workshops and conferences was to explore interdisciplinary 
answers to the question “does the body have a future?” The first of these events, 
“Bodies Past”, asked what the past history of the body could tell us about that 
question. It is from this seminar, held on 11th-12th November 2005, that the 
current volume derives.  
The thematic agenda of that seminar was as follows: 
 
• Property in the body and in the human genome: it is widely feared that we 
no longer possess a property in our own bodies. Instead, it has been argued, what 
we are witnessing is nothing less than a new 'Gold Rush', in which the territory is 
the human body.  
• The body and the person: are we our bodies, or are our bodies merely our 
tools? If we are embodied individuals what limitations does that place on our 
rights over our bodies? This question surfaces in all sorts of public policy issues 
from trafficking and prostitution to genetics.  
• Gendered bodies: to the extent that all human tissue is now the object of 
markets, it can be said that we are losing the distinction between men and women 
as subjects with rights over their own bodies. Similarly, gender reassignment, 
transvestism and other phenomena suggest that the distinction between gender 
and sex is breaking down. What can we now say about the supposedly immutable 
categories of male and female bodies?  
• Bodies, regulation and censorship: what are the limits of censorship over 
the body in literature, film and the visual arts more generally? Are there any 
restrictions on what people may see or do with their bodies? How do different 
countries view such rights, and what is the effect of globalisation on regulation 
by national jurisdictions?  
• Future bodies, cyborgs and humans: what does science fiction as metaphor 
tell us about our desires to control and shape our bodies? The use of the cyborg 
metaphor in feminist theorists such as Donna Haraway and in such writers as 
David Mitchell raises disturbing questions about the extent to which we can 
recognise human agency and emotions in non-human bodies.  
• The body and the body politic: to what extent is the individual body 
subsumed in the body politic? For example, in France, individual bodies can be 
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said in many important senses to belong to the national patrimoine and not in fact 
to the individual. What rights does the state possess over the bodies of its citizens 
and those of other States in peace and war?  
 
The issues raised in this line up of topics help to make clear why the “the 
future of the body” is currently a “hot topic”. More than that, the urge to look in 
a dynamic fashion to the future of the body is a major cause of contemporary 
anxiety. We live with intense fears of what the body might become as the result 
of genetic engineering, radiation or any branch of ideological fundamentalism. 
Darwin was able to displace his own analogous anxieties into an extraordinarily 
extended scenario: “believing as I do that man in the distant future will be a far 
more perfect creature than he now is, it is an intolerable thought that he and all 
other sentient beings are doomed to complete annihilation after such long-
continued slow progress” [as the sun cools in its death pangs] (Darwin, 1887: 
92, discussed by Gruber, 1980: 110). Our worries are more immediate. It is easy 
to look back to past bodies as receptacles of innocent, if naïve hopes: for we live 
with the eugenic nightmares of the mid-twentieth century. 
In the 1920s the publisher Kogan Page, attempting to “revive the pamphlet” 
as their advertising put it, produced a range of small volumes on the theme of 
“To-Day and To-Morrow”. The subjects of these ranged across the realms of 
morality, science, war, society, language, art and sport. We find Robert Graves 
writing on the future of swearing, Bertrand Russell on the future of science, and 
Rebecca West on the future of the sexes. The volume on the future of the body 
was written by Ronald Campbell Macfie (1867-1931), physician and poet. He 
gave the reader his version of the eugenicist prediction of the superman, or, as 
he called this figure, “the Metanthropos”. 
Macfie’s agenda is made perfectly clear. He states that “man’s control over 
his own evolution is perhaps the most interesting and most important in all 
biology” (Macfie, 1928: 51). This is vital because of deterioration in the 
breeding stock such that modern woman is often “as little capable of bearing 
fine children as suckling them” (80). Meanwhile, there are men who “take more 
interest in the lie of their hair and in the cut of their clothes than in virile 
exercise of mind, who no longer have the masculine love of fresh healthy 
eugenic women and the masculine loathing of paint and powder. We find an 
increasing tendency to sexual perversities” (81). The answer is to be rid of “the 
camouflage of artificial conditions of all sorts, from titles to dollars, to rouge 
and powder” (86). Marriage based on “normal sexual attraction” will do the rest. 
In 2000 he predicts that people, free from sexual perversion, will “dress 
wisely, and eat and drink wisely, and exercise wisely” (90). Moreover, he is 
optimistic that we might be able to alter genes, and that this could be the 
“subject of legislation among the Metanthropoi of 5000 AD” (89). Eventually, 
he concludes, “it will be possible, in time, to breed almost numberless varieties 
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of the highly moral, the highly intellectual, and there seems some likelihood that 
the Metanthropoi of the future will be divided into nations akin in mental and 
moral outlook” (95). Moreover, we will all come to look alike physically, 
“approaching the most beautiful and efficient possible” (95-6).  
Is that Blake’s glad day? And, if so, were not his dreams our nightmares? 
For Albion is not Black, Albion is not Female, Albion’s rosy cheeks are 
emphatically the result of nature rather than artifice: is Albion, after all, just a 
symbol of delusion and racist, misogyny? However, Blake’s men and women 
are not all alike. He depicted human bodies with “multiple histories of 
development and a variety, if not an infinity of possible futures” (Engelstein, 
2000: 70). The body has been a tool of fascist power and could be again. 
Perhaps we can learn from past visions and strategies of bodily self-
empowerment? Perhaps we need to do so? The Fabian socialist doctor, M. D. 
Eder wrote in George Bernard Shaw’s magazine The New Age, “let us be rid of 
the Superman. He is a bore” (Eder, 1908). We cannot afford to be flippant. 
Genomic research means that Macfie’s world of 5000 AD is going to happen, in 
some shape or form, during the twenty-first century. What better time to look 
back at the excitement and dangers of bodily potential? 
The Papers 
The purpose of this latter section of my introduction is twofold: firstly, it 
provides short summaries of the papers, and secondly, it aims to explore the way 
in which themes develop from paper to paper and to, thereby, make sense of 
their ordering. I want to emphasise that the rationale I have outlined for reading 
the current volume represents my own personal views and should not be 
regarded as representing those of the individual authors. I have simply been 
outlining one vision of the possible significance of collecting work of the kind 
found here. The research agendas of the contributors come from a diverse range 
of theoretical and methodological perspectives yet they all, in their different 
ways, explore and celebrate the cultural understandings of bodies past. They 
also, implicitly or explicitly, invite thought on the potential for the physical and 
cultural construction of bodies future. 
Cassou-Noguès engages with Descartes the philosopher who is frequently 
referenced as the celebrated exponent of mind/body duality. This paper 
highlights the fact that the cultural afterlife of Descartes has involved a degree 
of intellectual mutation. For Descartes thought that the body was a “machine”, 
yet his understanding of a machine was very different from ours. His 
differentiator between a human and a machine was the presence or absence of 
language, whereas for us, it is, Cassou-Noguès, argues, the presence or absence 
of emotion. Descartes’ position, when understood in its historical context in the 
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aftermath of centuries of Christian culture, is perfectly reasonable. For what is 
the mark of humanity, but the Word? Animals, not having words (and for 
Christians, souls), yet having emotions are, thus, essentially machines. Whereas, 
on the evidence of modern (i.e. Victorian and more recent) science-fiction, 
people have more recently had no problem with the idea of machines (robots) 
using language. Speech is understood as something that can be manufactured 
since it does not come from some transcendent source. Most interestingly, 
Descartes emphasises that words do not have to be rational.  He defends the 
human state of lunatics. His privileging of the Word is such that we do not need 
to even understand it, nor does it need to be capable of being understood by 
humans, in order to differentiate the human from the machine. Most recently, 
however, the cyborg has problematised the very notion of a division between 
man and machine, hence locking Descartes into a specific cultural context of the 
production of what have thus become bodies of the past. 
If the first paper problematises the boundary between human and machine, 
the second highlights the elaborate cultural constructions of mankind related to 
the division between the male body and the female body. Middleton tells us 
about Victorian facial hair and the cultural construction of masculinity in 
Victorian England. Widespread, if contested, modes of thought superimposed a 
gender division on that between mind and body, such that the rational mind was 
gendered male and the dependent body as female. Yet this left men’s bodies as 
strangely vulnerable, both as a pale adjunct to the supposedly powerful male 
intellect and, secondly, as uncannily feminised by their very embodiment. The 
nineteenth century saw something of a crisis of masculinity for reasons that 
have been extensively studied elsewhere. To give just two important cultural 
phenomena, the industrial revolution separated many careers from mechanical 
effort, and so left middle-class men as unmanned in comparison with their 
lower-class equivalents. Meanwhile, radical thinking was beginning to advocate 
the notion of rights – and even equal rights – for women. And it was here that 
biology was hauled in to rescue the male body from the danger of resemblance 
to women. Men started glorying in prominent, and sometime elaborate or even 
fantastical and perhaps fanatical displays of facial hair. Middleton, however, 
nuances this story by showing that male opinion was divided over the virtues of 
growing versus shaving. A key issue was that if power was based on rationality, 
and the body was an inferior concern, then a concern for facial hair represented 
a concern for that which was inferior, such that a well-tended and luxuriant 
beard could, in fact, be effeminate (remembering that the then construction of 
effeminacy was as an indicator not of womanliness, nor of homosexuality, but 
of weakness and debilitation).  
Amir’s contribution discusses the way in which time has been employed in 
the twentieth century in the construction of the female body as constrained by 
Introduction: Back to the Future of the Body 
 
8 
 
supposedly natural and inevitable limitations. Amir refers to “intertwining 
contingent and specific social arrangements with what are perceived to be 
objective biological facts” (44). In other words it is accepted that women on 
average cease to be fertile at an earlier age than men, as a result of the 
menopause, however, this has been misused as a justification and explanation 
for female disempowerment. The key phrase, “the biological clock is ticking”, is 
meant to conjure up the sense that a woman’s body is time-limited in the way a 
man’s is not. It is only fully functional for a limited period, and that 
functionality must needs involve reproduction. The discourse of the biological 
clock coincided with increasing demands for women to take a full and equal 
place in the workforce. However, it could be countered that nature prevents any 
such assumption of equality. Furthermore, this image suggests not simply a 
mechanistic universe, but also woman as mechanism responding to intractable 
laws. The body and its frailties are here projected as a limiting factor on human 
potential. To be fully female a woman must be intensely embodied, but to be 
intensely in a female body is to partially disqualified from the demands of high-
flying careers. 
Medical science, of course, in the shape of IVF treatments, is able to 
interfere, to some degree, in these processes. Such science, if considered to be 
gendered “male” might be seen as coming to aid woman in her temporal bodily 
frailty. The desire for scrutiny and control of the female body can be seen from 
the production of a set of male, potential, nightmare scenarios; that of massive 
lower-class reproduction heedless of the economic circumstances (as with single 
mothers), or else of middle-class abstinence from pregnancy through the pursuit 
of careers. Amir refers to the eugenic possibilities underlying such 
circumstances in that social conditioning and scientific intervention are 
available so as to construct the ideal “life path” for women and subject them to 
the operations of male power. 
It is not only gender relations that can be abused by systems of power. I 
would argue that racism focussed on skin colour and face shape is the result of 
sets of contingent social constructions. It is not, therefore, a permanent 
structuring element in human society. Thus, the body, in its external signs, can 
be the victim of its times. There can be medical conditions, such as albinism, 
that assume great cultural and personal significance because of transient cultural 
attitudes. Baker’s paper examines the cultural role of albinos in postcolonial 
African contexts. Why should it be culturally significant that there should be a 
small number of people with Black African physiognomy but with a lack of skin 
(and eye) pigment? This does not make them white, in racial terms, but it means 
that they becoming walking embodiments of the dilemmas of life in societies 
that have become deeply sensitised to racialised forms of thinking and acting. 
The albino body, in such circumstances, becomes powerfully uncanny, and 
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threatening to the comfortable binaries of black and white, dominated and 
dominant. In this sense it might be argued that the albino body is potentially 
empowered as a means by which to challenge racist assumptions. However, it is 
also deeply problematic for the counter-production of African pride and self-
assertion. The oppressor, it signals, also lives within. However, there is even 
more to it that that. As Baker points out, the albino was also constructed in pre-
colonial societies and, as such, has long been provided with an aura of the 
“mythical and the mystical” (81). The challenge here would appear to be 
whether the albino body can be returned to a lost position in African societies, 
perhaps by connection with the transcendental such that this body be recovered 
from its colonial reconfigurations. Or is the albino body trapped in postcolonial 
time, in which it refers both to the uncanny return of the ancestors and also of 
the colonial oppressors? 
Black albinos take on an external cultural burden of whiteness in 
postcolonial Africa whether they like it or not. As a Jew, Valeska Gert, was in 
the similar position of discovering that she was being read from her genetic and 
cultural heritage. Yet, as an artist, she sought to use her body to express the 
cultural contradictions of the times in which she lived. Foellmer’s paper shows 
the ways in which the body is not simply at the mercy of the past and the future, 
but can be developed to interact with time, place and discourse. Gert, in her 
dance practice, was thinking through the results of the rapid mechanisation of 
urban life as experienced in post-World War One Berlin so as to suggest new 
possibilities for the body in engaging with, enacting, and challenging modernity. 
In these ways she looked to the future as a place in which the body would be 
liberated from its old constrictions of behaviour. 
Of course, we, with the benefit of hindsight, know that her work was to have 
a limited impact. As Foellmer concludes, “her radical and groundbreaking art 
was attacked in a pamphlet by Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. 
Jewish and leftist, stigmatized as producing ‘Entartete Kunst’ (degenerate art), 
Gert had to flee temporarily to the alternative modernity of New York” (112). 
The bodies that Gert conjured out of the air were, thus, the product of a specific 
set of historical circumstances. When she flickered and jumped, disturbing her 
audience, she was reacting to the new and shocking experience of the flickering 
and jumping of the cinema. Yet she was acting out a fascinating modern 
paradox, that of the unique moment in the age of mechanical reproduction. In a 
sense, the power of time to single out and distinguish can seem in tension with 
the mass-production of things, objects and situations, such that in certain forms 
of post-modernist theory there is no longer a history but simply a seamless web 
of interchangeable expressions. But if this is the truth of modernising society 
then it was sharply interrupted, as we have seen, by Nazi censorship and 
warfare. For Gert’s art was not simply another example of mechanical 
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production (something that was essential to the Nazi war-machine) but 
represented a satirising or problematising of the boundary between bodies and 
machines. If Goebbels would have liked to preside over a nation of machine-like 
efficiency, Gert was, through her grotesque impersonations, requiring her 
audience to confront the possibilities for human standardisation through 
subordination. She produced bodies of the past which speak to us of dangers 
which have never gone away. 
Gert escaped to America, and thus hardly from “time” and “progress”, but 
two papers in this volume explore the notion that there is an escape out of time, 
or at least out of the tyranny of time. Time, in the Western, Christian tradition, 
and its cycles of growth and death, is the product of the Fall. The Garden of 
Eden before the Fall had no development, and neither does Heaven. States of 
perfection simply exist. Time itself is the demon unleashed by the act of free 
will. Corazza and Lobetti discuss East Asian views of embodiment which take 
significantly different theoretical positions from that which I have just outlined. 
Corazza emphasises that “fundamental to the Japanese approach is that bodily 
activities are primarily considered in terms of basho (the Japanese word for 
‘place’ or ‘space’) rather than time”. The Word in the Western, Christian 
tradition; that is that discourse that dances between minds considered as 
immortal souls, is considered as superior to the mutability and frailty of mere 
worldly space (including the space that is the constituent and habitat of the 
body). Hence, it can be argued that the very textuality of this current volume 
represents a denigration of the body and an elevation of mind-discourse. 
Corazza, however, explains Japanese concepts of bodily space as being not 
simply more prominent that in the west, but also qualitatively different and more 
nuanced. 
She emphasises the ways in which there are a variety of dimensions of 
bodily space which, crucially, are not limited by the skin. A person’s space, 
therefore, is not a singular pinpoint location but the product of the sum of that 
person’s inter-relationships. Our bodies, in this understanding, are in intimate 
contact and dialogue with, to use her examples, a stone that one holds, or an 
object that one sees. It is important to emphasise the intensity of touching that 
this attitude emphasises. This is very different from the notion that the 
apprehension of reality happens only within the body, in a central processor, 
either disembodied as the mind, or embodied as the brain, and that the rest of the 
body is simply a conduit for information from the outside. The implication is 
that what is of importance in much of Japanese thought is the intensity of 
engagement, emphasising individual bodily perception and effort. In this view it 
is not that time does not happen, but that it is simply not the most important 
factor. The time-related problem then appears in the form of inquiries as to why 
the Western body has not in the past been engaging with space in the ways 
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recommended by such Japanese viewpoints. The volume returns to Japan with 
the work of Lobetti, but first further explores Corazza’s notion of the potential 
of what she calls the “extended body”. 
Frampton’s concerns are with the potential for bodily extension and 
pleasure. She writes about wet-nurses, their presence and absence over the last 
three centuries. She tells a fascinating story of the ways in which the wet-nurse 
has vanished. The function of the wet nurse was to suckle the children of 
families who could afford to pay for this activity. The notion was that the 
provision of milk was simply an alimentary service. However, new notions of 
sanitation focussed on protecting the boundaries of the physical and 
metaphorical body increasingly rendered the wet nurse suspect. She was of 
inferior social class, she penetrated into the heart of respectable families and, it 
was thought, threatened to pass on taints, even hereditary taints, via the milk to 
the child. Meanwhile, the experience of breast-feeding was increasingly seen as 
something which had an important role to play in emotional connection between 
mother and infant. Frampton argues that this process can be thought to a further 
stage of development in which breast-feeding can be identified as having 
elements of pleasures and engagements between bodies that provide alternative 
potentials for bodily communication compared with those advocated by 
discourses that emphasise the intensities of sexual contact. Frampton highlights 
notions of “intercorporeity” in which “the outside world thus enters into and 
alters us, at the same time that we alter it” (137). This provides an optimistic 
sense of the possibilities and pleasures of bodily potential. 
But what if “intercorporeity” is forced? What if we want to be bodily 
extended not just in ourselves, but into being someone else? The feeling that 
technology might assist us to, in a sense, become the beings around us that 
fascinate seems like a modernist fantasy of empowerment, and a most disturbing 
one since it seems to offer up the potential to divide the world into a new set of 
colonisers and colonised. Such worlds are explored by Segal in her readings of 
three late twentieth-century films, Gattaca (1997), The Talented Mr Ripley 
(1999), and Being John Malkovich (1999). These films are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, enjoyably exuberant fantasies. But to what do they point towards? Segal 
suggests that the last of the three is particularly revealing of what she calls 
“queer desire”. Why, the fantasy asks, do we need to be restricted to the old 
biological tropes of a man and a woman producing a child? Why cannot a child 
give birth to a parent, and indeed be in the parent? There is an uncannily 
eugenic theme running through these films. In Gattaca and The Talented Mr 
Ripley the world belongs to those who appear to be superior (and, typically, are 
blond). The libidinous desire to be perfect and powerful and to possess someone 
beautiful and powerful lends perverse sexual energy to these films and implies 
that the frightening attraction of fantasies of perfection and domination has not 
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disappeared. If people differ in power then who will be the winners and who the 
losers in the struggle to extend the body? 
Does the body extend beyond death? Tomasini disagrees with Aristotle over 
the importance of respecting the dead. It is not that Tomasini supports notions 
that there is a supernatural reason for being careful with corpses. Rather, his 
paper argues that there is a deep-seated cultural understanding of humans as 
embodied entities, such that a corpse is not, at least, initially mere matter, but is 
still, in some degree a person. The case studies used to support this contention 
derive from the “improper removal, retention and disposal of children’s organs” 
at Alder Hey Hospital, Liverpool [U.K.] in 1999 (164). He references Ricoeur’s 
theories that present embodiment as being a key aspect of personal identity. This 
indicates that the notions of the extended body in its special connections with 
other bodies were well appreciated by outraged and grieving parents of the 
children in question, even if they were not appreciated or understood by the then 
medical authorities. The physical boundaries of the self, therefore, blur into 
those of others. Ones selfhood is at stake in the fate of a loved one and their 
body. 
But there are other ways in which the extended boundary of the embodied 
self is problematised: notably through cyborg entities and situations. The cyborg 
sounds new but, in some ways, is not. O’Neill reminds us that “humans and 
their bodies have been engaged with technology, its manufacture, use and 
consequences, since tools were first fashioned”, and she reminds us that since 
the sixth century B.C. teeth from the dead were being used prosthetically (174). 
She is worried, however, that with the growing complexity of medical 
possibility “it may be that our human embodiment will not assimilate to such a 
multiple or heterogeneous cyborg sense of belonging” (190). In other words, 
might we become metanthropoi by addition rather than transformation? Will we 
become so extended as to become merely things that are parts of other things? 
The suggestion is that the body/thing divide will be increasingly problematised, 
just as artificial intelligence will increasingly blur the mind/computer divide. 
Can we cope with the absence of boundaries, or will we generate new 
boundaries? Looking back to the future of the body suggests that we may, in 
fact, come to love our “attachments” even if, as in Tomasini’s paper, we come 
to find it hard emotionally to tell what is us, and what is not. 
A transcendent material and mental union has been dreamed many times 
before. Lobetti provides a fascinating account of Japanese ascetic practices. He 
describes ways in which, by following a range of practices, including “a diet 
consisting of pine needles, tree bark, pinecones, chestnuts and occasionally 
stones and crystals” (193), ascetics found ways to die in ritual circumstances 
such that their bodies, if all went well, did not decay, and they would then be 
held to have become “sokushinbutsu”, “Buddhas in their very bodies”. The 
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result is understood by devotees as an extraordinary exhibition of transcendence 
and bodily integrity (which is entirely vitiated should the body succumb to rot). 
The resulting “objects” (I use the word in relation to an outsider’s viewpoint) 
then become the focus of veneration, and, since the soul is alive and 
transcendent, as active forces in social life. It can be seen, therefore, that there 
are some similarities with the medieval cult of Christian relics. And just as in 
the shrines of medieval saints, so these bodies establish zones of sacred space 
providing opportunities for engagement between ordinary persons and 
transcendent beings.  
These ascetics chose their fate. The potential for the body may lie not just in 
the ways in which it can grow or transform, but in the location and degree of 
personal agency involved. McCarron presents us with narratives of people 
possessing limited agency. He discusses prison lives in which the surface of the 
bodies of prisoners is made to express via the medium of tattooing. An 
important shift appears to have occurred between the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in so far as the themes of tattoos are no longer focussed upon “the 
possibility of bodily transcendence”, but, as depicted in recent narratives, 
suggest that “the overwhelming majority of them [the tatooees] believe that 
there is nothing to them but bodies” (229). Such prisoners are, it is argued, 
objects that have significance only when under observation. In this sense, the 
life/death boundary has been transcended. Reality is the enactment of forms of 
death when in life, as in the skull tattooed on the skin, or as a biker in Hall’s 
Prison Tatoos claims, “’death is no big deal… Most guys in here are just as 
good as dead. We eat, we sleep, we shit. But what’s that? They already took our 
life’” (1997: 12). Agency here operates in relation to the degree to which 
inmates are able to extend the meanings of their bodies through surface 
decoration. 
Imprisonment, and hence liberation, can, of course, take both physical and 
ideological forms. Budgeon conducts a detailed examination of ongoing 
feminist attempts to discuss and understand and enhance the lives of women and 
their embodied experiences. Female experience is understood in feminist 
narratives as having been, historically speaking, more or less influenced by male 
oppression, distortion and appropriation. Attempts to redress the balance are, of 
necessary, implicated in such narratives, in that their reason for existence is 
partly to correct past inequality and this at least implies some sort of unequal 
performance in a gendered struggle for ideological and practical dominance. 
One approach taken by some feminists has been to return to the body; to 
celebrate its potential and materiality as being something “pre-social”, as a core 
of magnificent reality that has been obscured by misogynist discourse. Others, 
as Budgeon points out, (249) embrace a view of radical social construction in 
which the female body can be culturally reconstructed into positions of 
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empowerment. Both approaches can also be divided between those that wish to 
posit a mind that is transcendent of both body and gender, as the latter approach 
can sometimes suggest, or else to emphasise that male and female bodies in both 
their strength and weakness need to be foregrounded. Budgeon concludes by 
propounding the idea that both approaches are valid, so as to “engage with 
women’s embodied agency as it is located within specific locations and sets of 
practices” (250). In other words we can think with the body, in all its fleshy 
glory, and in its socially constructed temporal context. 
Whilst Budgeon traces the complexities of feminist strategies of theoretical 
engagement with the body, Kotef does this and something more, commenting 
that “like any other subject, women are constructed by complex, overlapping, 
and shifting grids of discourses” of which feminist theorising is one (268). This 
paper emphasises that studying such phenomena may not ultimately result in 
some sort of perfect “understanding” of past and self. Nevertheless, such 
struggles are not simply an ongoing enactment of evolving forms of hermetic 
criticism. Kotef’s paper is about a struggle for freedom, both ideological and 
also physical, as represented by the nineteenth-century, dress-reform movement. 
In material terms the paper is about bloomers: “a dress, composed of loose 
trousers that narrowed at the ankles, covered by a skirt the often only covered 
the knees” (254). The aim was, quite literally, to enable women to move more 
easily and even, should they wish, to be able to visibly part their legs in public 
just like men. The resulting furore and ultimate abandonment of the dress has 
been understood in terms of, firstly, an attempt to liberate women from bodily 
encumbrances or, secondly, a moment when there was an unusual focus on 
bodiliness in the context of female emancipation in which women wanted to 
focus attention on the stifled potential of their bodies or, thirdly, the moment 
when the ideal of transcending the female body was produced as the result of 
“an agonising sacrifice” (268). From this point it was decided that reform of 
female appearance would be abandoned and energy focussed on the notion of 
mental equivalence to men and the demand, coming in the wake of this 
assertion, for the vote. 
Conclusion 
The theme of the last essay brings us back to the underlying issue of why we are 
here: if it is not to perpetuate a pre-existing consensus, is it simply to engage in 
a form of conversation, a minority discourse in which conceptions of the body 
are comfortably relegated to the role of symbolic traces of the real business of 
academic career progression? Hopefully not. Out there, beyond the recondite 
delights of reading and reasoning, there are bodies that are not just symbols of 
something else; bodies that are culturally constrained when they need not be, 
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that are misunderstood when they need not be. The papers of this volume cannot 
provide a programme for the potential and future of the body through its 
necessarily limited investigations of the past. Above all, there has not been 
space to engage with every important issue: most notably, the volume does not 
engage with the problems of the medically diseased body (Porter, 2001: 
particularly chapters 3 and 4, provide a useful introduction to several key 
issues). What this volume can hope to achieve, however, is to aid the imagining 
of forms of cultural health for the body.  
Such states that transcend prior limitations and disabilities could, and I 
would argue, should, take many forms. This agenda is not simply about 
perfecting a salvation narrative of rebirth such as that which puzzled the initial 
viewers of Stanley Kunbrick’s 2001: a Space Odyssey: 
 
reviewers had gone into the screening expecting a traditional drama of human 
crisis, love, hate, battle and resolution up among the stars. What they got was one 
man’s obsessively detailed, multi-million dollar waking dream of humankind’s 
evolutionary and technical destiny… [which ends with] one of cinema’s most 
extraordinary images of hope and wonder: the benevolent wide-eyed starchild at 
the film’s end, all wisdom and compassion (Bizony, 2000: 15-16). 
 
In Arthur C. Clarke’s novelisation of the screenplay he wrote jointly with 
Kubrick, the human who has been reborn as a result of an alien-encounter 
returns to earth and saves the planet from nuclear destruction (Clarke, 1968: 
223). This collection of papers does not, I am afraid, point to such a single 
amazing solution as being on its way to us courtesy of either alien or human 
science. As Blake knew, we must work for our own bodily revolution. We do 
not, of course, all want to, or need to, come to resemble the perkily youthful, 
male, English pinkness of Blake’s eighteenth-century starchild (fig. 1.1). Our 
“metanthropoi”, these papers suggest, can be extraordinarily diverse. In this 
volume we find men, women, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, feminists, whites, 
blacks, albinos, tattooed prisoners, grieving relatives and medically enhanced 
patients displaying, defending, understanding and extending their bodies in 
ways which may give us ideas for the future of our own. 
Acknowledgements 
I must thank all the contributors, the organising committee and all the other 
participants of the Bodies Past workshop on which this volume was based. 
Special tribute must go to the then Director of the Birkbeck Institute for 
Humanities, Prof. Donna Dickenson. Thanks are also due to the Trustees of the 
British Museum for permission to reproduce Blake’s “Albion Rose” and to 
Andrew Rudd for reading the final text of this introduction. 
Introduction: Back to the Future of the Body 
 
16 
 
Works Cited 
Bizony, Piers, 2001: Imagining the Future (London: Aurum Press, 2000). 
Butlin, Martin, The Paintings and Drawings of William Blake: Text (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 
Canning, Kathleen, “The body as method? Reflections on the place of the body 
in gender history”, Gender and History 11 (1999), pp. 499-513. 
Clarke, Arthur C., 2001: a Space Odyssey (London: Hutchinson, 1968). 
Dutton, Kenneth R., The Perfectible Body: the Western Ideal of Physical 
Development (London: Cassell, 1995). 
Eder, M. D., “Good breeding or eugenics,” The New Age, May 16th (1908), p. 
47. 
Engelstein, Stefani, “The regenerative geography of the text in William Blake”, 
Modern Language Studies 20 (2000), pp. 61-86. 
Gruber, Howard E., “Darwin on man, mind and materialism”, in R. W. Rieber, 
ed., Body and Mind: Past, Present and Future (New York: Academic Press, 
1980), pp. 79-115. 
Hall, Douglas, Prison Tattoos (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997). 
Howard, Seymour, “William Blake: the Antique, nudity and nakedness: a study 
in idealism and regression”, Artibus et Historiae 3 (1982), pp. 117-49. 
Hubbard, Philip, Sex and the City: Geographies of Prostitution in the Urban 
West (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 
Macfie, Ronald Campbell, Metanthropos, or the Body of the Future (London: 
Kogan Page, 1928). 
Porter, Roy, Bodies Politic: Disease, Death and Doctors in Britain, 1650-1900 
(London: Reaktion, 2001). 
Turner, Bryan S., “The body in western society: social theory and its 
perspectives”, in. ed. Sarah Coakley, Religion and the Body (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 15-41. 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE BODY AS A MACHINE:  
DESCARTES, SHERLOCK HOLMES AND ROBOTS 
PIERRE CASSOU-NOGUÈS 
 
 
 
My paper is mainly concerned with Descartes’ representation of the body as a 
machine. It aims at contrasting this Cartesian machine with images of “robots” 
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature. As is well known, Descartes 
distinguishes the mind, which is a thinking substance, and the body, which he 
considers as a machine. In a way (and that has been discussed by various 
philosophers) this distinction between mind and body, with the definition of the 
body as a machine, is a consequence of the new physics that emerged at the turn 
of the seventeenth century.1 Descartes, taking the full scope of this new physics, 
seemed to open up a new era for philosophy in which we still live. I will argue, 
however, that the Cartesian representation of the body as a machine, with its 
specific characteristics, has somehow been abandoned. We now have a different 
image of the body as a machine. As various examples in science fiction show, 
we may still see the body as a machine but we tend to give different 
characteristics to it. That also leads to a shift in the mind-body problem.   
Considering the body as a machine, Descartes is led to a whole series of 
questions: for example, how do I know that the person in front of me is indeed a 
human being and not a machine (a robot as we would say) pretending to be 
human? The machine as a representation of the body is always also a possible 
representation of the human being, body and mind. It is true of Descartes’ 
machines, and it is true of the robots of science fiction. In fact, several times, 
especially in his correspondence, Descartes makes thought experiments, which 
could easily be (and in fact have been) turned into science-fiction stories. 
However, these stories, in science fiction, would hardly end with the same 
conclusion.  Descartes’ machine no longer appeals to us as it did to the 
philosophy and the literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It has 
                                                 
1 For a recent discussion, Putnam (1999). 
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become uncongenial to our imagination. I will contrast two images of the man-
machine: one that is defined in Descartes’ texts and a second one that appears in 
literature in the second half of the nineteenth century and, in particular, in 
science fiction.2 
What then distinguishes the Cartesian idea of the body-machine from ours? I 
will delineate my theses and come back to the texts later on.  First, the paradigm 
of the machine as a representation of the body, in Descartes, is a clock, an 
automaton that, once set in motion, as it is wound up, seems to act by itself. On 
the other hand, when we speak of a robot, we rather imagine a calculating 
machine, a computer. The robot, it is true, is not simply a computer, but its 
central part is a computer. What distinguishes different generations of robots in 
science-fiction novels is essentially their brain, the computer that animates the 
various parts of the machine. 
Moreover, Descartes admits that a machine could express any kind of 
emotions or what he calls passions. That includes hunger, cunning, anger, fear 
or love.3 What distinguishes human beings from machines is language (speech).  
Machines, according to Descartes, cannot use language or cannot use language 
normally. Now, generally, our robots, in science fiction, have the opposite 
characteristics. They can use language (they speak, they reason, they may even 
joke), but they cannot show emotions. Though one can find counter examples, 
the image of the robot that circulates in science fiction is apathic (without 
passion). The human being is no longer defined by its language but by its 
emotions.         
On one hand, we have a clock, which is mute but can express love for its 
master, or distress when it unwinds. On the other hand, we have a computer, 
which can talk to us but remains impassive.  My point is that the mute but 
sympathetic clock is no longer a plausible image for us. It also follows that, if 
one may speak of a mind-body problem in literature, the problem of finding out 
what makes a human a human is no longer the same as it was for Descartes. The 
problem is no longer to unite the machine with a mind that would explain the 
use of language, which a machine by itself cannot produce. The problem is 
rather to find out how emotions may come to a body, which, apparently, could 
still be a machine.4 I will try to give textual evidence for this shift in our images 
                                                 
2 The term “man-machine” was coined by La Mettrie (L’homme-machine, 1748); the 
term “robot” was coined by R. Capek in the play RUR in 1920. I will use these terms to 
refer to any machine (also in Descartes’ texts) that might imitate human behavior.  
3 Descartes’ examples, in his letter to Morus, Feb. 5th 1649 (Descartes, 1953: 1318, 
1320 ; Descartes, 1985: III, 360 and sqq.). 
4 Descartes considers that speech is ”le seul signe certain d’une pensée latente dans le 
corps” (“the only certain sign of a thought hidden in the body”), To Morus, Feb. 5th 1649 
(Descartes, 1953: 1320 ; Descartes, 1985 : III, 366). Language, or speech, is the only 
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of the body as a machine. But, beforehand, I would like to make three more 
points.  
 First remark: Descartes’ machine and the robot of science fiction are 
not the same device and it is not the same function that these machines lack. 
Now one thesis would be that this function, which the machine lacks, is itself 
projected into another figure. In Descartes’ texts, it is language that machines 
miss, or a certain kind of speech, and that speech is always referred to the figure 
of the madman. Incidentally, it shows that the figure of the madman has a 
function in Descartes’ epistemology. It is not simply an exteriority, a figure 
outside rationality and by the exclusion of which rationality is defined, as 
Foucault argued. This role given to the madman seems to bring us closer to 
Derrida’s interpretation (see below footnote 8). I will give some quotations later 
on. The discourse of the madman is, in Descartes’ texts, the paradigm of a 
speech that a machine will never master and that defines humanity. Now, in our 
literature, say in science fiction generally, machines lack emotions, desire in 
particular, and it seems to me that a good candidate for a figure of emotions, 
which would correspond to the figure of the robot, is the vampire. The character 
of the vampire as we know it, an aristocrat (“male” or “female”) who needs to 
seduce its victims before it can draw their blood, appears earlier, at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, but it seems afterwards to develop parallel 
to the new image of the man-machine, the apathic computer. The vampire seems 
to be the opposite of the robot: the vampire is essentially governed by its 
emotions (its desire for blood) whereas the robot only follows its reason.  The 
opposition of the man-machine and the madman would then structure classical 
imagination whereas the opposition of the robot and the vampire would 
structure our imagination.5  
Second remark: in this discussion, I only refer to the robot, a machine that 
imitates, as far as it can, human beings and constitutes an individual. However, 
there are in science fiction other kinds of machines, which, like Descartes’ 
machines, have something to do with the production of emotions. I am thinking 
in particular to the machines that enter into the constitution of the cyborg. The 
cyborg is a mixed entity, with both organic and mechanical components. Now, 
                                                                                                             
function that cannot be accounted for by the mechanism of the human body. It forces one 
to acknowledge the presence of a soul in the body of another. Emotions, or sympathy for 
other beings, in science-fiction seem sometimes to play the same role as speech in 
Descartes’ texts:  “If a mechanical constructs halts in its customary operation to lend you 
assistance, then you will posit to it, gratefully, a humanity that no analysis of its 
transistors and relay systems can elucidate. A scientist, tracing the wiring circuits of that 
machine to locate its humanness, would be like our earnest scientists who tried in vain to 
locate the soul in man.” (Dick, 1995: 212).   
5 At least, it is the thesis I defend in my book (Cassou-Noguès, forthcoming).  
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as components of the cyborg, machines seem to take a new role. There is a 
whole corpus of texts around cyborgs that relates the mechanical components to 
the production of emotions and thus delineates another image of machines. That 
image is also at the center of the concept of the “desiring machine” in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. I will leave that image aside to concentrate on 
robots that are mechanical individuals.6 
 Third remark: I argue that our machines, contrarily to Descartes’ 
machines, may use language, I only refer to our image of machines, to the 
machines of literature, science fiction in particular. I do not mean that, since 
Descartes, we have been able to build machines that speak normally, or that we 
know that machines, in principle, may use natural language. That, obviously, is 
still a question for philosophy or cognitive science. However, generally 
speaking, the robots of science fiction may talk as well as human beings do. 
They can only be distinguished from human beings by their lack of emotion. 
The machine, as an image, is talkative but apathic. By an image, I understand a 
description, which appeals to us, even though its characteristics are not 
rationally justified. There seems to be a relative independence between images 
and knowledge. On one hand, images modify with knowledge and technology, 
as the whole development of science-fiction shows, but, on the other hand, 
images do not simply illustrate knowledge. We imagine talking machines, 
machines that use natural language although we do not know whether machines 
can use natural language.  
I will now try to substantiate these points by a few examples. Let us start 
with Descartes’ position. Descartes distinguishes the mind, which is a thinking 
substance, and the body. Descartes is convinced that all the functions of the 
body, breathing, digestion, the beating of the heart, can be explained in 
mechanical terms.  The body then appears an automaton, a machine that, once 
wound up, acts by itself till it breaks or unwinds. The example that Descartes 
takes is almost always that of a clock: 
 
these functions [such as digestion of the food, the beating of the heart, etc.] 
follow from the mere arrangement of the machine’s organs every bit as naturally 
as the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the arrangement of 
its counter-weights and wheels (Descartes, 1985:  108). 
 
Again: 
                                                 
6 Similarly, I will ignore the gender of the robot. There are, of course, famous “female” 
robots such as in Hoffmann’s novella Der Sandmann, Hadaly, in Eve future from Villiers 
de l’Isle-Adam (1886), Rachel Rosen, in Dick (1968). It is not clear however that these 
“female” robots have specific characteristics, except that “insensibility” that defines 
modern machines.  
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the difference between the body of a living man and that of a dead man is just 
like the difference between, on the one hand, a watch or other automaton (that is, 
a self-moving machine) when it is wound up and contains in itself the corporeal 
principle of the movements for which it is designed, together with everything 
else required for its operation; and, on the other hand, the same watch or machine 
when it is broken and the principle of its movement ceases to be active 
(Descartes, 1985: 330). 
 
It is clear in these texts that the model, for the body-machine, is the clock, an 
automaton that seems to act by itself. This image is not peculiar to Descartes, 
One also finds it in the introduction of Hobbes’ Leviathan. 
Now, according to Descartes, a human being is the union of a soul that is a 
thinking substance and a body. Descartes is then led to consider all animals as 
machines, since otherwise one would have to give them a soul. Therefore, every 
aspect of the behavior of animals must be considered as the result of their 
mechanism: this includes breathing and digestion, but also hunger, cunning, 
anger and, apparently, love. Descartes does not deny that animals do appear to 
have some kind of life, some sensibility or may express some emotions. He 
argues that these can be accounted for by mere mechanism.7  
This question reappears with respect to human beings. Of course, I know 
that I am not simply a machine but also a soul, a thinking substance. I know that 
I think, and thought, as experienced in the first person, has to be referred to a 
thinking substance, a soul, beside the body. However, how do I know that the 
person whom I face is not a machine? The experience of thinking, in the first 
person, might assure this person that he or she is not a machine but this 
experience by itself does not communicate. It is then a problem, for Descartes, 
to find out whether it is possible to recognize from the outside a human being 
from a machine that would imitate human behavior. As in the case of animals, 
Descartes believes that the expression of natural “appetites” (hunger or thirst) 
and “passion” (joy, fear, love, anger) can in some case be accounted for 
mechanically and, therefore, could be reproduced by a machine. A robot, to use 
a term Descartes does not know, could show us his hunger or his love. It is only 
the use of language that distinguishes the human being from a machine or an 
animal. Descartes clearly separates the use of language from the expression of 
passions, which machines can imitate: “we must not confuse speech with the 
                                                 
7 “I am not disturbed by the astuteness and cunning of dogs and foxes, or by all the things 
which animals do for the sake of food, sex and fear; I claim that I can easily explain all of 
them as originating from the structure of their bodily parts.” Descartes also mentions 
“natural impulses of anger, fear, hunger, and so on” (To Morus, 5th Feb. 1649) 
(Descartes, 1985: III, 365-366). 
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natural movements which express passions and which can be imitated by 
machines as well as by animals” (Descartes, 1985: 140). Or again: 
 
in fact, none of our external actions can show anyone who examines them that 
our body is not just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts, 
with the exception of spoken words, or other signs that have reference to 
particular topics [ou autres signes faits à propos des sujets qui se présentent] 
without expressing any passion. I say “spoken words or other signs”, because 
deaf-mutes use signs as we use spoken words; and I say that these signs must 
have reference [que ces signes soient à propos], to exclude the speech of parrots, 
without excluding the speech of madmen, which has reference to particular topics 
even thought it does not follow reason. I add also that these words or signs must 
not express any passion, to rule out not only cries of joy or sadness and the like, 
but also whatever can be taught by training to animals (Descartes to the 
Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646) (Descartes, 1991: 302). 
 
Of course, Descartes knows that an animal like a parrot can articulate a few 
words. He defines true human speech, which neither machines, nor animals can 
imitate, with two negative criteria. First, words must not be the exterior signs of 
an immediate passion (like the cry of joy, the “I am thirsty” of the child or the 
“hello” of the parrot which expects a candy). Second and more surprisingly, 
human speech must be able to be unreasonable, not to follow the laws of reason. 
A good example of this human speech, I think, would be wit (because wit 
neither expresses an emotion, neither follows logic). Descartes does not mention 
wit but he always refers this human speech to the madman. The discourse of the 
madman makes sense even though it might be both impassive and unreasonable. 
Thus the madman, as the keeper of true human speech, seems to become a 
peculiar figure in the Cartesian texts, opposite to that of the machine.8    
Finally, Descartes is led to thought experiments that anticipate science 
fiction. In a letter to an anonymous correspondent, in 1638, Descartes imagines 
the following situation. A child is raised in a faraway land where he only meets 
human beings, such as his parents, and automata: automata in the shape of 
human beings and automata in the shape of small animals that are offered to the 
child for him to play with. There are no animals in this land, just humans and 
                                                 
8 The role of the figure of madness in Descartes’ metaphysics was at the centre of the 
controversy between Derrida and Foucault. In a nutshell, Foucault (Foucault, 1961:  Part 
I, chapter V) argued that classical rationality (in particular, in Descartes) is defined by the 
exclusion of madness and, therefore, related to the social exclusion of madmen (with the 
multiplication of asylum). Derrida (Derrida, 1963), relying on the Méditations 
Métaphysiques, maintained that madness was incorporated into Descartes’ metaphysics. 
The text just quoted on language and machines seems to confirm Derrida’s position. 
Madness appears as an irreducible feature of humanity.  
